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Peter G. Warr*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Four themes can be detected in much of the large literatur e on
benefit-c ost analysis to emerge in the last decade.

The first is that

market prices are presumed to be distorted , whether because -of undesirab le
governme ntal intervent ions or the absence of optimal intervent ions, a
problem that is usually claimed to be most serious in the less-deve loped
countries .

The second is that there is assumed to be a central agency

of the governmen t whose task is to determine welfare maximizin g shadow
prices, discount rates, etc. for use in project evaluatio n throughou t
the public sector, and occasiona lly in the private sector as well.

This

agency has relativel y unrestrai ned powers in the exercize of this task,
but essential ly no powers to influence the governme ntal tax policies,
etc. that are responsib le for, or could eliminate , the dis~ortio ns in
market prices.

Conseque ntly, it must treat existing market distortio ns

as given in its welfare maximizin g exercize.
The third theme is that the literatur e attempts to develop "rules"
for guiding this agency in its task which consist, ideally, at least, of
principle s for deriving the optimal set of shadow prices from observab le,

or potential ly observabl e, data.

Finally, there is the theme that this

aim is best achieved by relating productio n in the public sector to
internati onal trade.

The simplest and m::,st widely accepted result to

emerge from this literatur e is that, given the usual "small coW1try"
assumptio n, the relative shadow prices

of

cotm00dit ies traded internati onally

~onash Universit y, Melbourne - Presently a Visiting Fellow, Economic Growth
Center, Yale Universit y

2.

should be set at their relative international (border) prices.

This

result has been found to hold regardless of the existence of (non
prohibitiye) tariffs, government budgetary constraints, or distortions
in the markets for non-traded commodities and regardless of the precise
form of the welfare function being maximized.

1

There has been much less

agreement on the appropriate principles for guiding the shadow pricing
of non-traded collUIOdities.

Numerous seemingly conflicting rules are to

be found.

The present paper attempts to clarify the issues involved by
analyzing a particularly simple general equilibrium model, seemingly
the simplest.model possible which captures the essence of the problems
involved.

Sections II and III attempt to clarify the relationships

between the various shadow pricing rules advocated in the literature
and the conditions under which they are correct.

The aim is not to

derive new benefit-cost rules but to clarify the existing ones within
a simple unified treatment.

The paper then asks, in Section IV, how

the shadow pricing rules derived from.this and other, similar, analyses
would be applied in practice, particularly when, as much of the literature

suggests, the shadow prices obtained are to have wide application within
the public sector, which is itself large in many less-developed countries.
The question of how sufficient information is to be generated in practice
to apply the shadow pricing rules advocated for non-traded commodities
has been ignored by IOC>st of the literature and proves to raise severe
problems.

This is so even in seemingly minimal rodels.

In Section V

the paper then turns to examine the implications of some alternative
shadow pricing procedures which, while not "optimal" in a world of
costless information, nevertheless offer greater prospect of being
informationally feasible.

3.

II.

DERIVATION OF THE OTPIMAL SHADOW T'RICE

Details of the Model
The economy consists of a single consumer and two firms, one "private"
and the other "public".

There are three co1I1IOOdities.

Commodities e and

i are traded internation ally at prices which are given for the economy
concerned, the first being an export good and the second an import good,
while commodity n is non-traded.

Cotm00dities e and n are consumed

domesticall y, but commodity i is not consumed.

It is a fully imported

intermediat e good, not produced domesticall y.

Commodity e is produced

in the public firm, using commodity n as an input, while commodity n is
produced in the private firm using commodity i as an input.

The consumer's

utility function is U = U(ce, en), where ce and en de~ote the consumption
of comm::>dities e and n, respectivel yi

This function is assumed to be

U > 0.
quasi-conca ve and twice differentia ble with U,
n
e

The public firm's

where xe and x n denote respectivel y the
production function is xe = g(x)
n
public firm's output of commodity e and its use of commodity n as an input.
.The private firm's production function

is

yn = f

(y.) ,
J.

where l 7

n

a.11.d y.

].

denote respectivel y the private firm's output of co1I1IOOdity n and its use
of commodity i as an input.

The functions g and f are assumed to be twice

differentia ble with g', f' > 0 and g", f" < 0.

The variables ce, en,

X

e

,

xn·' y e and y.J. are all constrained to be non-negativ e .3
The internation al prices of commodities e and i are normalized at
unity, so the trade balance constraint for the domestic economy can be
written

. l..•
e -y

Ce'$X

-

(1)

.

Equivalentl y, the imports of comt00dity i cannot exceed the net exports of
commodity e.

There is also a physical balance constraint which applies

4.

to comm::>dity n, namely
C

< y n' n

X

(2)

n·

"'~'

-- .
of coilllOOdity n cannot exceed the difference between the
The consumption
private firm's production and the public firm's usage of that commodity.
The domestic market prices of commodities e, n and i are denoted pe' pn
and p., except that units of measurement are chosen such that p e
i

= 1.

The private firm maximizes its profits and the consumer maximizes
his utility, each treating market prices parametrically.

Assuming

interior solutions, as we do throughout this ·paper, this implies that
f'(y.) = p./pn
1.
i
and
Un /Ue

= p.
n

Any tax revenue is turned over to the consumer in lump-sum form along
with the profits of the private firm and any profits of·the public firm.
Any losses.incurred by the public firm are financed by lump-sum taxes on
the consumer.

This simplifying assumption avoids complications arising

from a government budgetary constraint, but will be relaxed later in the
paper.
The public firm attempts to maximize "shadow" profit, using the
shadow prices given it by a "project plannern, treating these shadow
prices parametrically.

These shadow prices are denoted s e andsn

(comm:>dity i is neither an output nor an input of the public firm),
except that we nonnalize again by settings e - 1.

This implies that

the shadow price of the non
The project planner's task is to sets,
n
traded conuoodity, so as to maximize the consumer's utility.

This is

the only control variable the project planner possesses; in particular,

5.

he has no control over the governme nt's tax policy and must treat the
Our concern in this

existence of any distortio nary taxes as given.
paper is with how he should go about this task.

Derivatio n from an Optimizat ion ModeZ
Consider first the welfare maximiza tion problem in the absence of
any tax distortio ns.

This "first-be st" problem is simply
max U(c, c) subject to (1) and (2).
n
e

The first-ord er condition s for a maximum are

=- ·1/f'

(3)

1/f' = g'.

(4)

Un /Ue

and

These imply that
and

p.

l.

=

1.

We now introduce a tariff on imports of coIIIIl'Odity i at the proportio nal
rate t, so that p.l. = l+t.
of this tariff.

No explanati on is offered for the_ existe~ce

It is to be regarded as a purely distortio nary inter-

vention which must, neverthel ess, be taken as given for the purposes of
shadow pricing.

This assumptio n is central, because all of the problems

discussed in this paper would vanish if this tariff were eliminate d.

The

basic assumptio n is one of a governmen t with discrete areas of control,
where the distortio ns created by one branch create problems for the
welfare-m aximizing tasks of another.
We now have
U /U

n e

which violates (3).

=

(l+t)/f',

(5)

The "second-b est" welfare maximiza tion problem is

now
max U(c , c ) subject to (1) , (2) and (5) •
n
e

6.

Deriving the first order conditions for this problem we now obtain the
result- that
pn + tARn
s =
1 + tAR
n
e

= pn

+ tA

t-

e ,
n
p n R~
l + tAR
e

where A= -1/(R f' - Re + Q), Q = (l+t)f"/(f 1 )
n
etc.

2

(6)

and R = i3 (U n /Ue ) /c3c e ,
e

Even in an extraordinarily simple model like the present one, the

expression for the optimal shadow price of a non-traded commodity in
the presence of a market distortion is surprisingly complicated.

It is

obvious, simply by inspection of (6), that its informational requirements
are substantial.

7.

III. COMPARATIVE STATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE OPTIMAL SHADOW PRICE

•

We now-consider whether, and in what sense, the optimal shadow price
derived above is consistent with the various shadow pricing rules advocated
in the literature.

Market Behavior Interpretation and the ''Weighted-Average" Rule
First, we derive a ioore interesting, and ioore useful, form of (6) which
substitutes the derivatives of

the private firm's supply relation and the

R and Qin (6).
consumer's demand relation for the terms R,
n
e

This has the

substantial advantage that relationships observable in market behavior are
substituted for the unobserved first and second derivatives of production
The resulting expression proves, on rearrangement,

and utility functions.

to be the well-known "weighted-avera ge" formula derived by Harberger (1969

and 1971).
The equation f'(y.)
· 1
it with respect top

n

=

hold for all p.
(l+t)/pn must
n
•

Differentiatin g

is therefore legitimate and gives
(9)

Q = -1/Y. = -(l+t)/(pn Ynn l,
in
and Y
·where Y. - dy./dp
nn
n
i
in

= dyn/dp.
n

Similarly, the equations R{c e , c)
n

=

denotes the consumer's marginal rate of substitution,
pn' where R(c, c)
n

e

= M, where M denotes the consumer's
U /U, and the budget constraint c e +pc
n n
n e
lump-sum income, must hold for all p n and M. Substituting the demand relations
M) into these equations, differentiating with
= C (p ,M) and en= C (p,
n n
e n
5
respect top and M, and solving for Rn and Re we obtain
n

c

e

R -pR

n

where C

nn

_ de /dp.

n

n

n e

=C

-1

(10)

nn

Substituting this into (6) gives, on rearranging,
s

n

a:

C

Pn

nn

p

n(C -Y )
nn nn

. eL<i+t>-j
Pn

r - l

(l+t) (C

'

y

nn
-Y

nn

nn

)

(11)

(12)

a.
where r

=Ynn/Cnn •

This is precisely the Harberger "weighted average"

formula and is clearly a vastly 100re useful expression for the optimal
shadow price than (6).

The intuitive meaning of (11) is straight-for ward and is illustrated
in Figure 1.

The consumer's demand relation and the private sector supply

and Y (p ), respectivel y? Aggregate demand is
relation are marked Cn (p)
n n
n
of course the consumer's demand plus public sector demand and the market
price is determined by the intersectio n of the aggregate demand and
private sector supply schedules.

Consider a .one unit increase in public

1
0
This forces a rise in p n from p n top,
n
1
0
from c n to c and production to rise from
which causes·consu mption to fall
.
n
l
0
y toy. Together, these effects sum to the increased public demand.
n
n
The marginal social cost of the fall in consumption is indicated by the
1
0
demand for good n, from x n to x.
n

consumer's willingness to pay,the market price, p.
n
the first term in (11).

This accounts for

For a discrete change this gives the left-handed

shaded area under the demand relation.

The marginal private cost of the

the good's supply price, but not all
increase in production is also p,
n
ot this is a social cost. Part of it is simply a transfer of tariff
revenue to the government induced by the increased imports of good i.
The marginal social cost is the payment to foreigners for increased
imparts of good i, namely dy./dy
n
i

= 1/f' = p n /(l+t).

This accounts for

the second term in (11) and the right-hande d shaded area under the schedule
Yn (pn/(l+t)) in Figure 1.

This schedule represents the marginal social

minus
cost of producing good n which is its marginal private cost, p,
n
the tariff revenue generated per unit of good n produced, tpn /(l+t).
This schedule also represents what the supply relation for good n ~ould

be in the absence of a distortion in the market for good i.

..9.

The optimal shadow price of the non-trade d good reflects the marginal
This is given bya

social cost of drawing the good into the public sector.

"weighted average" of the good's market price and marginal social cost of
productio n, the weights reflectin g the proportio ns in which additiona l
public demand is satisfied by a fall in consumpti on and a rise in productio n,
respectiv ely.

These proportio ns are indicated by the relative slopes of

the demand and supply relations .

The Government Revenue Rule
This rule focuses on the effect that the public use or productio n of
a good has on total governmen t revenue.· Its use in benefit-c ost analysis
has been advocated by Harberger (1971) and Boadway (1975) and has its
origin in a classic paper by Hotelling (1938).

It states that the shadow

price of a commodity is what we will call its "governme nt revenue effect",
consistin g of its producer price minus (plus) the effect on total tax
revenue of a unit increase in its net·use (productio n) in public projects.
It is shown below that this rule is correct, provided that the only
distortio ns present are tax-induc ed, and provided that the numeraire
·commodit y is shadow priced similarly .

In particula r, if the nwr.eraire

commodity is traded, as in the present case, and is valued at its
internati onal price, then the correct version of this rule is that the
shadow price of a non-trade d commodity is its governmen t revenue effect

relative to that of the numeraire comm::>dity. ·
We will show that this rule gives a result identical with (6) •

show this it is convenien t to different iate equations
with respect to

X

e

and

X

n•

(1) ,

To

(2) and (5)

This gives the system

l

0

l

ac /axe
e

ac /'ax
n
e

0

l

-f'

ac /axe
n

ac ;ax
n
n

Re

Rn

Q

ay./3xe

oy./axn
i

i

=

1

0

0

-1

0

0

(13)

. Now,
The effect of changing xn on total tax revenue is simply tay./ax
n
1
substitu ting from the above system, the governm ent revenue effect of

-

. -. '

comm:><:lity n is given by
(14)

tAR,
Pn - tay./ax
n
n = pn +
1

It is obvious , by comparis on with (6), that

where A is defined as in (6).

this is only the numerato r of the optimal shadow price.

But the shadow

.
price of the numerai re coDUIOdity, as given by this rule, is 1 + tay./ax
e
1
Substitu ting again from (13) we obtain
p

n

- tay.;ax
1

n

1 + tay,/ax
. l.

which is identica l with (6)

e

=

tAR
n
1 + tAR'
e

(15)

7

The intuitiv e interpre tation of this result is best seen from the
left-han d side of (15).

From the duality propert ies of non-lin ear

8
programm ing toodels, we known that

au;ax

n

The tariff distorti on causes too little of good i to be importe d.

To the

it
extent 1:}lat public demand for good n forces up the market price, p,
n
induces addition al private sector product ion, and hence addition al imports
of good i.

Each addition al unit of y.1 so imported raises nationa l income

by p. = l+t, but costs only its interna tional price, unity, the net gain
1

being the magnitud e of the tax, t.

measure s the
Consequ ently, tay./ax
n
1

ng x and should be subtract ed from p n in
indirec t benefit from increasi
n
.
forming the numerat or of (16). Similar ly, increasi ng x e generate s
"foreign exchang e" earnings which the consume r will spend partly on
consump tion of good e·and partly on good n.
up p

n

as before.
which in turn increase s y.,
1

The latter effect pushes
Consequ ently, tay./ax
e
1

must be added to the "foreign exchang e" return from producin g a unit
of good e in forming the denomin ator of (16).

11.

The government revenue rule has an important, and previously
wideveloped, implication.

It implies that, when the correct shadow

prices are being employed, any project losses incurred at market prices

will at least be matched by the indirect effects of the project on tax
revenue? In other words, provided the project makes non-negative profits
at shadow prices, no additional taxes or increases in existing tax rates

need be introduced to finance the losses the project incurs, if any, at
market prices.

It should be stressed that this result holds only when
It is nevertheless

the distortions in market prices are tax-induced.

important, since previous authors have thought it necessary, in analyzing
this case, to assume that any project losses could be financed by the
imposition of non-distorting taxes, and have argued that relaxing this
strong assumption would necessitate changes in the shadow prices
calculated •10
First, consider a small marginal project that is viable at shadow
prices.

dx)
We represent this project by a pair of numbers (dx,
n
e

representing an output of good e and input of good n such that
dx

e

n

n

Then, from (15),

Let T = ty. denote total tax revenue.
1

dx (1 + 3T/3x) - dx (p
e

e

(17)

~ 0

- s dx

n

n

-

3T/3x)
n

~

0

(18)

and
~

(19)

p dx - dx
e
n n

The right-hand side of (19) is the project losses at market prices and
the left-hand side is its indirect effect on tax revenue.
is (at least) self-financing.
shadow

The project

If the project exactly breaks even at

prices, then both (17) and (19) become strict equalities, and

the project is exactly self-financing.

12.

Turning to the large scale application of shadow pricing in the
public sector, it is now easy to show that any losses incurred by that
sector at"market prices must at least be matched by the indirect tax
effects of public production.

This implies that x e - g'(xn )xn

of g(.) •

x

e

- s x

n n

This follows directly from the concavity

~

~

O.

So g'(x)
n

O, and the argument proceeds as before.

= s n implies

Similarly, the

marginal unit of public production, if just exactly viable at shadow
prices, generates enough tax revenue indirectly to match exactly its
impact on public sector losses at market prices.

There is no need to

impose adciitional taxes to finance project losses, provided that projects
are viable at shadow prices.

Alternatively, the existence of a government

budgetary constraint does not imply the necessity to revise shadow prices,
in the case where market price distortions are tax-induced.
The Finat Conswrrption Rute ·

This rule focuses on the effect that public use or production of a
good has on the value of final consumption.

It appears to have its origin

in Meade (1955) and its use is advocated, in general terms, in Dasgupta,
Marglin and Sen (1972).

The rule states that the shadow price of a

COIDIOOdity is given by the effect of a unit increase in its net production,
or a unit reduction in its net use, in the public sector on the value of

final consumption at consumer prices.

We will call this the comnodity's

"final consumption effect", and we will see below that this rule is
correct, provided, as above, that the numeraire comnodity is shadow
priced similarly.
(13).

This result is obtained easily from equation system

The final consumption effects of comrcodities n and e are given by
/ax + p nocn/ax)
- (oce
n
n

and

/ax
ac /oxe + p n3c
e
n
e

Substituting from (13), the ratio of these expressions is identical with
(6), a result which is obvious from (16).

13.

The "Foreign Exchange Equival,ent" Rul,e
This rule focuses on the connection between the production of non
traded COIIIII0dities and the domestic country's foreign exchange earnings.1

1

Its use is advocated in the influential writings of Little and Mirrlees
(1969, 1972a, 1972b and 1974), in Bruno (1962 and 1967), and in virtually
all of the domestic resource cost literature, such as Balassa and Schydlowsky
(1968), Bruno (1972) and Krueger (1972).

It has been applied extensively to

benefit-cost analysis and effective resource cost calculations in many
countries.

In the case of a non-traded input used by a public project and

produced elsewhere (say, in the private sector), the rule states that the

shadow price of this good is the marginal cost, in terms of traded inputs
valued at their international prices and non-traded inputs valued at their
respective shadow prices, of supplying the good from this source.

In the

literature this has come to be called the good 's "foreign exchange equivalent" •12
The shadow prices of the good's non-traded inputs are obtained by
similarly breaking them down into their respective inputs, ultimately
giving their shadow prices in foreign exchange terms.

This, and the

existence ·of pri~ary factors and labour, creates computational difficulties

which will nevertheless not arise in the present analysis:3 The construction
of the model is such that the meaning of the "foreign exchange equivalent"
rule is simple and unambiguous.

There is only a single variable input used

in the production of the non-traded commodity and that input is traded.
The "foreign exchange equivalent" of the non-traded commodity as given by
this rule is simply

n = 1/f' = pn/(l+t)

dyi/dy

(20)

By comparison with (6) and (11) it is obvious that this differs from the

optimal shadow price.

This is seen most clearly by reference to equation (11).
public sector demand implies a rise in p.
n

-

. '\

Suppose that consumers do not

Then C = 0 and (11) collapses to the foreign
nn

respond to this price rise.
exchange equivalent rule.

Increased

Alternatively, referring to (12),
lim s

r

n

= p /(l+t) .
n

(21)

-+ ..,

The Little-Mirrlees foreign exchange equivalent rule can be seen as the
limiting case of the optimal shadow pricing rule for a non-traded commodity

where all adjustment in non-traded goods markets to an increased public
sector demand occurs on the production side.

This will occur, strictly

speaking, only if demand is completely inelastic or supply is infinitely

elastic. 14

The Market Price RuZe
This rule simply evaluates commodities at their market prices,
regardless.of the existence of market distortions.

Its use is recommended

by Rudra (1972), Weckstein (1972) and, in the case of non-traded coimOC>dities,
as an approximation to the shadow prices given by the final consumption rule,
by Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) and Dasgupta (1972)! 5 This rule is
immediately seen to be the opposite limiting case from the Little-Mirrlees
rule, since, from (12),

(22)

The market price rule corresponds to the limiting case of the optimal shadow
pricing rule where all adjustment to increased public sector demand for a

non-traded comm:>dity occurs on the consumption side.

Indeed, it is easily

seen from (12) that fort> 0 and for any specified value of p
that r

~

n

(noting

0),

(23,

15.

Strong criticism of shadow pricing rules which rest, explicitl y or
implicitl y,· on approximations to "optimal" rules would, if based solely
on the kind of theoretic al analysis presented so far, be unfair.

Though

the point is not always made explicitl y, many of the authors concerned
have clearly viewed the practical problems of attemptin g to implemen t
"optimal" rules as being prohibiti ve.

Neverthe less, it is fair to say

that these writings have typically lacked any systemati c discussio n of
what the optimal rules would arrount to, of precisely what the practical
problems are that prevent their implemen tation, or of why the particula r
approxima tion rules they recommend are considere d superior to other
feasible approxim ations.

We now turn to these issues.

16.

IV.

PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION

While the comparative static interpretation of the optimal shadow
-

•

C \

pricing rules is of interest, it still leaves the central informational
questions unanswered.

How is sufficient information to be generated in

practice to apply these rules; and if the informational problems are
We now examine these issues with

probitive, what cari be done instead?

the aid of an extensive set of numerical examples.

This serves both

to illustrate the nature of the problems involved in shadow pricing and
to provide a convenient vehicle for studying the efficacy of· alternative

means of dealing with them.

This is done by exploring the welfare

implications of alternative shadow pricing strategies within the context
of log-linear production functions and Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
Numerical examples of this kind enable a number of interesting conceptual
experiments to be performed and these can be quite helpful in obtaining a
feeling for the quantitative significance of some of the issues involved.
While it would obviously be unscientific to assert generality for the
numerical results obtained, examples of this kind can be valuable in
showing the kinds of numerical outcomes that emerge when seemingly
"reasonable" assumptions are made; it is orders of magnitude and
directions of effects,rather than precise numerical results, that are
of most interest.

1.

The Numerical, ExampZes
We assume the following functional relationships:
g(x) =

n

X

a

n

,

and

Given these functional assumptions, four parameters characterize the state
·
16
of technology and consumer tastes: a, B, y and b. The parametezs a, B and y

17.

are constrained to lie in the interval (0, 1) and b > 0.

Table 1 presents

the complete equilibrium solutions for the ioodel for the specific case
a• B = y =½and b = 1.

Column (1) presents the solution to the first

best optimization problem characterized by equations (3) and (4).

is, of course, no tariff on comnodity i in this case.

There

Column (2) presents

to solution to the second-best optimization problem characterized by

equations (5) and (6), where the tariff on comnodity i is fixed at t = 1.
This numerical example, a= B =a=½ and b = t = 1, will henceforth be
referred to as Numerical Example I.

For comparison, columns (3) and (4)

present the equilibrium solutions when the public sector uses the market
the foreign exchange equivalent price, p n/(l+t), as
price, p, and
n · ·
shadow prices. The solutions represented by the remaining columns of
Table l will be explained later in the paper.17

•

To examine the degree to which the numerical results obtained reflect
the partic~lar parametric assumptions embodied in Numerical Example I we
perform extensive parametric variations.

The set of parametric values

employed will be called Parameter Set A.

It consists of three subsets,

Parameter Set A has~ and 8 independently taking the
1
values (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9) with y, band t held fixed at the values

given in Numerical Example I.

Parameter Set A2 has a and 6 constrained

to be equal and this common value and y independently take the values

(0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9), while band tare fixed at unity, as before.
Parameter Set A has a= B = y =½as in Numerical Example I and band
3
t take the values (0.5, O. 75, 1, 1.25, 1.5) and (0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2),
independently. Each of Parameter Sets A1 , A2 and A3 has 25 elements, each

element being a quintuple (a, B, y, b,. t).

The union of these sets is

Parameter Set A and their intersection is Numerical Example I.
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2.

Applica tion to Marginal Project s
It is importan t to distingu ish between the informa tional and adjust..

~

,_'

ment problems of shadow pricing when benefit- cost analysi s is seen, on
the one hand, simply as a way of evaluati ng small margina l project s on
an infreque nt basis, and on the other as a tool for widespr ead applica tion
. f or
.
·
. 1 ications
o f be ne f.1 t -cos t ana l ysis
wi. th.in the p ubl.i c sector.lB The imp
overall resource allocati on are, in the first case, small by definiti on,
but in the second case they are potenti ally very conside rable.

While we

two cases,
have seen that the same shadow. pricing "rules" apply in the
.
the problems encounte red in their applica tion are far greater in the
second case than in the first.
Suppose that initiall y the public sector is basing its product ion
decision s on market prices.

The optimal shadow price is now to be

estimate d using the rule given by (12) for use in a small margina l
project .

Let r

0

denote the correct value of rat this point, and t

denote the estimate of r

0

which is in fact fed into (12).

errors will, in practice , be made int.
precisio n in the estimati on of r

0

Obvious ly,

Indeed, obtainin g greater

will entail costs and it will not be

rationa l to invest in this informa tion gatherin g activity beyond the
point at which the expected margina l benefits of the informa tion
gathered equal its margina l costs.

This could well mean that no

resource s should be invested in collecti ng informa tion for the estimat ion
of r

0

,

but in any case it is clear that it would virtual ly never be

optimal , even if it were possibl e, to elimina te all error in the value
of t>1hich is in fact fed into (12).

How sensitiv e is the resultin g

shadow price to errors int?
0

Conside r the elastic ity of s n tot, evaluate d at the point t = r •
In the case of Numeric al Example I, this elastic ity is 0.14. A ten per
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cent error int gives a 1.4 per cent error in s •
n

a,

a,

Allowing the parameters

y, band t to vary across Parameter Set A gives values of this

elasticity ranging from 0.0005 to 0.17.

We must conclude that, for this·

class of example at least, the estimated value of s

n

is not particularly

sensitive to errors int in the case of a small marginal project.
reason for this is clear on inspection of (12).

The

Since r appears in both

the numerator and denominator with the same sign, changing the value of
r has only a small effect on the overall expression.
Suppose now that the true value of r is completely unknown and that
no estimation of it is feasible.

We have already seen that the shadow

price given by (12) is bounded, on the one hand by the market price, p,
n

and on the other by the foreign exchange equivalent, p /(l+t). Can we
n
say which of these is likely to be the better approximation? We
investigate this by computing19
0

m = (s

1
0
0
·O
- p )/(p - p /(l+t)).
n
n
n
n

(21)

The superscript "zero" denotes evaluation of the variable concerned.at
the solution where the public sector is initially shadow pricing commodity
n at its market price.
and unity.

The closer

0

Clearly m potentially takes value between zero
0

m

is to unity, the better is the foreign exchange

. l ent as an approximation
'
.
equiva
of sl ,
n

°

wh·i 1 em

that the market price is a close approximation.
midway between the two.
tor

0

= -1.

. d'icates
c 1 ose to zero in
0
.
If m = 0 • 5 , th ens 1 is

n

It is easily verified that this case corresponds

In the case of Numerical Example I, m0

= 0.77,

but performing

parametric variations over Parameter Set A we find values of m0 ranging
from 0.16 to 0.98.

Either the market price or the foreign exchange

equivalent can be the better approximation to the appropriate shadow
price, and no broad generalizations could conceivably be justified.
There is really no alternative to estimating the value of r0.
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3.

Problems of Large Saale Applio ation

We now consid er the applica tion of the shadow pricing rule given
- . "
by (12) as an instrum ent for nnving the economy from some non-op timal

'

positio n to the second -best optimum .

For simpli city we will suppose

the initial positio n to be one where the public sector is shadow
pricing COIIlDX)dity n at its market price.

In the case of Numeri cal

Example I, this initia l solutio n, and the solutio n aimed for, are
describ ed in column s (3) and (2) of Table l, respec tively.

We can

think of this occurr ing either in a single step or, rrore plausib ly,
iterati vely.

To 11Dve from the initial positio n to the second -best

optimum in a 'single step it is necessa ry to estima te the ri_ght hand
side of (12), not at its curren tly observ able value, but at the value
it takes at the second -best optimum .

We will denote values at the

latter solutio n by the supers cript(* ).
0
y observ able and the initia l
p n , is directl
The initia l value of p,
·
n
0
value of r, r , can in princip le be estima ted. But the values of these

variab les at the solutio n aimed for, p*n and r*, are what must be fed
into (12) to llDVe directl y to that solutio n, and these typica lly will
differ from their initia l values .

For exampl e, in the case of Numeri cal


Example I, the values of s n at the initia l positio n and at the second
20
0
.
.
= 1.0075 , respec tively. obviou sly,
be st optimum ares n = 0.8206 ands*
n
the empiri cal determ ination of s*n is a sizeab le task. In practic e,
errors will be made; indeed , it is diffic ult to avoid the view that
in practic e estima tes of s*n would be based largely on guessw ork. Denote
p~.
an estima te of s~ by~~- It is clear from (12) thats~ < p~ ands~ <
0
so for values of s*n such that
Furthen oore, on a priori ground s, s*n < p,
n
0
l
s*n"'~ t*n"'~ p n welfar e will at least not be reduced relativ e to the initia
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position .

x

n

> x*.
n

s*.
The danger is of choosin g§*<
n
n

This leads to "oversh ooting",

How sensitiv e is the potenti al welfare gain from shadow pricing

to errors of this sort?

< s* and the welfare level
Conside r the value oft*n such that§*
n
. n
obtained from the use of this shadow price is the same as that obtained
0

pn •
from ·the use of the initial market price,
.

....0

Then

Call this values n •

-0
for §* < s , welfare is reduced relative to the use of the market price.
n
n
How large an error ins*n is required for this to occur? In the case of
...0
Turning
Numeric al Example I, s correspo nds to a 20% underes timate of s*.
n

n

to Paramet er Sets A , A2 and A3 , the percenta ge errors ins~ required to
1

reduce welfare relative to the initial position fall in the interva ls
(1, 40), (5, 28) and (8,25), respecti vely.

Seeming ly very small errors

in the estimati on of the optimal shadow price can lead to w~lfare outcome s

that are worse than the use of unadjus ted market prices.
to say thats*n can be estimate d "more or less".

enough

It is not good
In this class

of example s, at least, a relative ly high degree of precisio n in the

estimati on of the optimal shadow price is required to support the
: ....
·presum ption that its use will raise welfare rather than reduce .LI..
The informa tional problem s of m::>ving to the seoond- best optimum in
It seems alm::>st inevitab le that the use of

a single step are severe.

shadow pricing rules to achieve the second- best optimum would have to
proceed iterativ ely, using only current ly observa ble data at each step •
0
0
. . 11
The m::,st obvious iterativ e process is the followin g. In1t1a y, s n = p.
n

these data.

1

0

at this point and from (12) compute s n using
1
1
This causes pn and r to adjust to the values pn and r . We

We estimate the value of r

2

• •
re-estim ates n from (12) giving s n , etc.

•-r+l
n •
where

T

'tET/(l +t)-g
'
T
Pn
1

-r

denotes planning time.

So, assumin g no errors are made,
T ""

0, 1, •• •

-

Aside from the obvious possibi lity of

(24)
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no errors
error at each step there is the furthe r proble m that, even if
are made at any single step, the proces s need not conver ge.

·This proces s

but since the
is analyz ~4 in Warr (1978) , for a somew hat differ ent model,
ideas involv ed are simila r, the analy sis need not be repeat ed.

The questi on

is wheth er non-co nverge nce is a proble m in this model.
param etric
Conve rgence occurs in Numer ical Examp le I, but of the fifty
nce occurs
combi nation s contai ned in Param eter Sets A1 and A2 , non-co nverge
optimu m
in nine cases. It does not occur in A3 • The point is that if the
a pract ical
is to be approa ched iterat ively , as above, non-co nverge nce is
possi bility that canno t be dismis sed.

In such cases, even though no errors

the
are made in the iterat ive applic ation of the rule given by (12},
toward s, but
adjust ment proces s this genera tes does not lead the economy
at each step.
furthe r away from, the soluti on aimed for, reduci ng welfar e
", shadow
Of course this proble m can also occur with other, "non-o ptimal
pricin g rules, as well.

The essenc e of the diffic ulty is that inform ation

a disco~ tinuou s
on the right hand side of (12) flows to projec t planne rs on
basis.

were
If contin uous and instan taneou s adjust ment of shadow prices

is obvio usly
possib le the proble m discus sed here would not arise; but this
impra cticab le.
into
Finall y, quite aside from the possi bility of introd ucing errors
s the
the proces s and the possi bility of non-co nverge nce, there remain
that they
obviou s fact that iterat ive adjust ment proces ses take time and
involv e adjust ment costs.

Provid ed the proces s is conve rgent, the optimu m

it, the
is approa ched,n ot direct ly, but by altern ating iterat ively around
iterat ions becom ing succes sively close r.

Obvio usly, substa ntial resour ce

1
welfar e
reallo ca~io ns must occur· over time, and these are costly ~ The
compa red
gains ultima tely achiev ed, discou nted to the presen t, must be
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with
with the discoun ted adjustm ent costs of reachin g that solutio n, along
an
the opport unity costs of the skilled manpower etc. require d-for such
exerciz e.

It become s less and less clear that this is an activit y that

makes practic al sense.

We now turn to examin e some possib le alterna tive

shadow pricing proced ures which avoid some of these problem s.

2.4.

V.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SHADOW PRICING
We now conside r some alterna tive shadow pricing procedu res, all of
-

•

'· J

which have been advocate d, in one form or another , in the benefit -cost
analysis literatu re.

First, we conside r simply the first iteratio n of

the iterativ e process describe d above.

Second, we suppose that an "adjust 

ment factor" is estimate d at the initial position and then applied as a
constan t adjustm ent to the market price.

Next, it is assumed that shadow

prices are estimate d from an economy -wide programm ing m:>del, and finally
we compare the use of the unadjus ted market price with the use of the

Little-M irrlees foreign exchange equival ent shadow price.

1.

Single Iteratio n Results
Suppose the rule given by (12) is applied by measurin g the numeric al

magnitud e of the right hand side of that express ion at some initial
position and then applying this shadow price through out the public sector,
rather than simply for a "small" margina l project .

We will assume, as

before, that the "initia l position " is one in which the market price of
. commodi ty·n is being used as its shadow price.

Consequ ently, this procedu re

am:>unts simply to the first iteratio n of the iterativ e mechanis m describe d
above.

What is the welfare outcome from this procedu re?

Conside r the change in welfare resultin g from the applica tion of this
shadow price, rather than the initial market price.

We present these

welfare effects as a percenta ge of the welfare gain to be achieved from
m:>ving from the same initial position to the second- best optimum .

In the

case of Numeric al Example I this percenta ge welfare effect is 12.8.

The

equilibr ium solution resultin g is presente d in column (5) of Table 1.
Turning to Paramet er Sets A1 , A2 and A3 , the percenta ge welfare effects
fall in the interva ls (-2019, 99.9), (-386, 98.3) and (9.3, 26.7).
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Obvious ly, a negative percenta ge welfare effect indicate s that the single
iteratio n procedu re reduces welfare .

Of the 25 paramet ric combina tions

consider ed in each of Paramet er Sets A1 and A2 , welfare falls in 11 and
13 cases, respecti vely. Welfare rises in each case of Paramet er Set A3 •
A

surprisi ng feature of these results is that the welfare effects from

a single iteratio n of applying the rule given by (12) can be negativ e,
even though the repeated applica tion of this iterativ e process leads
ultimate ly to converge nce on the second- best optimum .

Clearly , the

once-an d-for-al l applica tion on a large scale of the "optima l" shadow
pricing rule using current ly observa ble data may be welfare increasi ng
or substan tially welfare reducing , but is is not a procedu re that can
be recommended with any confiden ce.

2.

Estirrr1ting a Constan t Adjus~ment Faator
A

second obvious alternat ive is to estimate the brackete d term

in (12} at an initial position and thereaf ter to apply this term as a
constan t adjustm ent factor to the. (curren tly observed ) market price·.
0

Let t.~e initial value of the brackete d term be K
0

•

Then this shadow

Obvious ly, since the adjustm ent

pricing rule is simply s n = p n K.

factor is measured only once, the infonna tional problem s of applying
this rule are substan tially less than those encount ed with the "optima l"
rule above.

The equilibr ium this procedu re leads to is not the second

best optimum since, in general , K ~ K*.
0

Neverth eless, in this class

of example s the welfare effects of applying this rule are reasona bly
impress ive.

As 1:>efore, we compare the welfare effects from 100ving from the
initial position (use of the market price as a shadow price) to the
equilibr ium resultin g from the applica tion of this rule with those
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of 1I0ving to the second-best optimum as above.
the percentage welfare effect is 99.2.
- - " J
In Parameter
Sets A , A

2

1

In Numerical Example I,

(See column (6) of Table 1.)

and A the percentage welfare effects fall in
3

the intervals (96.5, 99.93), (94.3, 99.98) and (97.7, 99.5), respectively.
In every case, the welfare effects are positive and superior to those of
the single iteration application of the optimal rule, and in most cases,
substantially so.

0

What this means is that K and K* are reasonably

close in this class of examples~ 2 Furthermore, as we have seen, the
0

estimated value of K is relatively insensitive to errors in the estimation
0

of r .

The generality of this result seems worthy of further e~ploration,

but the proc~dure of estimating a constant adjustnent factor to apply to
the market price of a non-traded good seems promising for practical
purposes.
3.

Shadow Prices from Pl'ogramming Models
Another, quite different, shadow pricing procedure recommended in

the literature, is to construct a non-linear programming model of the
economy and to compute the prices associated with a first-best optimum. 23
These prices are then used as shadow prices for benefit-cost analysis,
even though there are in fact fixed market distortions.

This procedure

avoids the substantial programming problem of incorporating market
distortions satisfactorily into the model, but its use rests on the
assumption that the shadow prices associated with first-best and
second-best optima are numerically similar, a proposition that is
by no means obvious when market distortions are significant.

Never

theless, in this class of examples at least, this assumption is a
very good one.

The shadow prices associated with first-best and

second-best optima are not identical, but they are very close.
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Denoting the shadow price associated with the first-best optimum
0

In Numerical

bys** we consider the ratio (s** - s*)/(s* - p ).
n
n
n
n
.
n

Example I this ratio is 0.022, while in Parameter Sets A , A2 and A3
1
it falls in the intervals (0.00008, 0.15), (0.00001, 0.25) and (.0.007,
0.04) respectively.

In almost all cases, s* ands** are very close.
n
n

Comparing the welfare effects of applying this shadow pricing procedure

with those of applying the optimal (second-best) shadow price as above,
the percentage welfare effect in Numerical Example
column (7) of Table 1.)

I

is 99.7.

(See

Those occurring in Parameter Sets A , A2 and
1

A fall in the intervals (96.2, 99.99), (91.5, 99.99) and (99.4, 99.86),
3
respectively.

In every case, almost all of the welfare gains that are

achievable from the use of the optimal second-best shadow price can be
achieved with this procedure.
These impressive. results assume, of course, that the non-linear
programming rrodel from which shadow prices are computed incorporates
the correct values of the parameters of the model.
errors would obviously be made.

In practice, some

How sensitive are the welfare gains

·to be achieved from applying this procedure to errors in the parametric

assumptions underlying the computed shadow prices?
parameter b.

Let the true value of b be

o and

We focus on the

the estimated value of

b, which is actually fed into the non-linear programming model, be

b.

We will assume that all the other parameters of the model, a, 8 and y
are estimated without error.

from

o for

The question is how much

b must

differ

the welfare gains potentially to be achieved from applying

this shadow pricing procedure, starting from the initial use of market
prices, to be eroded.
Either an underestimate or an overestimate of 0 can give this
result.

In Numerical Example I, where, of course, b .. 1, values of
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b of 0.65 and 1.37 lead to the same welfare outcome as the use of market
The percenta ge errors that these values

prices in the public sector.
-

•

·. .I

represen t are not particu larly great.
these lead to welfare losses.

Obvious ly, errors in excess of

Turning to Paramet er Sets A1 , A2 and A3 ,

the percenta ge overesti mates of

o

that lead to the same welfare outcome

as the use of market prices fall in the interva ls (8, 65), (4, 43) and
(13, 51), respect ively.

The percenta ge underes timates of b giving the

same outcome are similar.

The point is that quite small errors in :Scan

give welfare outcome s that are worse than the use of market prices, even
though a large proporti on of the welfare gains potenti ally obtaina ble
from shadow pricing can be achieved using the correct paramet ric value.
These errors are in many cases well within the accepted toleranc e limits
of econome tric estimati on.

It can hardly be assumed , then, that the

shadow prices obtained in practice from programm ing nodels will be
welfare -increas ing.

The resultin g shadow prices, and the welfare effects

followin g from their use, can be highly sensitiv e to errors in the para
metric estimat es that are fed into the programm ing models.

4.

Market 'Price Versus Foreign Exchange Equi~aZent
Finally , we ask whether it is possibl e to rank the welfare outcome s

resultin g from the use of market prices as shadow prices for non-trad ed
commod ities on the one hand, and the use of the Little and Mirrlee s
foreign exchang e equival ent shadow prices on the other.

In the present

BOdel, neither procedu re presents any informa tional difficu lties so this
question is certain ly of interes t in a world in which the informa tional
problem s of applying the optimal rules are conside red prohibi tive.
one of these rules dominate the other?

dominan t.

Unfortu nately, neither is

Does
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Consider the change in welfare resulting from persuance of the
foreign exchange equivalent rule until equilibrium is achieved, starting
from the initial use of the market price.

As before, we will compare

this welfare effect with the welfare gain from adoption of the optimal
(second-bes t) shadow price.
welfare effect is 88.

In Numerical Example I this percentage

In Parameter Sets A1 , A2 and A3 , however, these

percentage welfare effects fall in the intervals (-3703, 99.98), (-5429,
99.99) and {83.4, 92.1), respectivel y.

Either the market price rule or

the foreign exchange equivalent rule may be vastly superior to the other.
Of the 25 parametric cases in each of Para.I1¥?ter Sets A1 , A2 and A3 , the
market price rule is superior in 7, 7 and zero cases, respectivel y.
important point is that no overall generalizat ions are possible as to
which rule is superior.

The
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VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The literature on benefit-cos t analysis abounds with "rules" for

the sha9Q~_..pric ing of non-traded conmodities .

This paper has attempted

to explore the issues involved within the context of a simple general
equilibrium model illustrated by extensive numerical examples.

It is

argued that while several of the rules advocated prove to be equivalent
and correct, the most operational ly useful of these, within the context
of the simple model being analysed, is due to Harberger.

When shadow

pricing is being applied widely throughout a large public sector, however,
which numerous authors (not including Harberger) clearly intend, its
information al problems are greatly compounded.

The data necessary for

the estimation of the optimal shadow prices are not (locally) observable
and the welfare gains potentially obtainable from the use of the correct
shadow prices can be eroded by quite small errors in the shadow prices
estimated.
The efficacy of alternative means of dealing with these problems are
explored in the paper.

Two of these, the estimation of constant adjustment

factors to .be applied to market prices and the estimation of shadow prices from
"first-best " non-linear progrannning models are shown to have desirable properties
. within a broad class of numerical examples.

Nevertheles s, the welfare gains

potentially obtainable from the latter exercize are shown to be quite sensitive
to errors in the parametric assumptions underlying the programming exercize.
TWo other shadow pricing rules conunonly advocated for non-traded conunodities ,
the use of unadjusted market prices and the use of "foreign exchange equivalent"
shadow prices, are shown to be incorrect, whether these shadow prices are to
be used on a small or a large scale.

Furthenoore , it is shown to be impossible

to generalize as to which of these is likely to be the better approximati on
to the optimal shadow price •
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1.

Much of the credit for this important re~ult must be assigned to the
pioneering work of Little and Mirrlees (1969).

See also Joshi (1972),

Carden (1974), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974), Findlay and Wellisz (1976),
Warr (1977b) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978).

An

important exception

to the rule is the case of binding quantitativ e restriction s.

See Warr

(1977a).
2.

There ~y well be other factors of production used in both firms, but
these factors are assumed to be specific to the firm concerned and
imm:>bile between firms.
this paper.

Hence 1 they will not affect the _analysis of

Also, the single consumer's utility function may be inter-

preted as a social utility function where the individual consumers have
identical homothetic preference maps.
3.

In this case U must also be homothetic

Some hypothetica l names for these commodities may be helpful.

Goods e~

n and i may be thought of as "cheese", "milk" and "feed grains", respectivel y
Milk is produced using imported feed grains (and other specific factors)
in the private firm.

The public firm is a cheese factory producing that

good for export using milk as an input.

Milk is non~traded due to its

high transport costs and both milk and cheese are consumed domesticall y.
4.

For convenience , the total derivative notation is used in this discussion,
but the partial derivative notation would be equally correct.

35.

5.

is
Our assump tion that the single consum er is the sole income recipie nt
import ant here, since dM/dpn = c n

So the slope of the demand relatio n,

de /dp = acn (pn ,M)/apn + c n acn (pn ,M)/aM . This is the slope
n
n
of the incane compensated demand functio n. Relaxin g our assump tion

c

nn

z

of a single consum er and allowin g differe nt income recipie nts to
have differe nt tastes would compli cate this interp retatio n.

6.

Note that since all prices other than p n , namely p.i and p e are in fa.at
fixed in this model, the usual partia l equilib rium eeteris paribu s
rium
assump tion is unnece ssary, and hence Figure 1 depicts a genera l equilib
analys is.

7.

Figure 1 owes much to the author 's discus sions with R.M. Parish .

The denomi nator of (15) may be interpr eted as the shadow price of foreign
exchang e in units of domest ic currenc y and the numera tor as the "shadow
price" of commodity n, if one wishes , and many authors · procee d in this
way.

But it is then necess ary to compute two shadow prices , rather than

one.

This is inconv enient because both expres sions are more comple x than

(15), having a conunon complex denomi nator.

It is simple r, and $Uffic ient,

to take their ratio as in (15).
8.

More precise ly, introdu cing the variab les vn and ve such that
thensn = (au/avn )/(au/ av).
C = y - X + V and Ce = Xe - y.i + V,
e
e
n
n
n
n

9.

'!his discuss ion has benefi ted greatly from conver sations with
W.M. Corden .

10.

See, for exampl e, Sriniva san and Bhagwa ti (1978, p. 114).

This issue

is also discuss ed in Corden (1974, pp. 390-392 ) and in Dasgup ta and
Stigli tz (1974, pp. 28-29) .

In Warr (197.7b) it is shown that the

existen ce of a governm ent budget ary constr aint does not affect the shadow
.

-

-

.

pricing of traded commo dities subjec t.to tax distort ions.
discuss ion extend s that result.

'lbe presen t

36.

11.

The use of the words "foreign exchange" is, strictly speaking, inappropriate
in m::>dels in which m::>ney is not present.

Nevertheless, this has becorre

comm::,n·usage and does little harm.
..

12.

-
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In Findlay and Wellisz (1976), Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978) and Warr
(1977a and 1978) it is shown that the "foreign exchange equivalent" rule,
appropriately interpreted, is correct for the valuation of a non-traded
factor of production.

In all these models the set of consumed goods is a

subset of the set of internationally traded goods, so that increasing
"foreign exchange" earnings is equivalent to an outward shift in the
consumption possibility set.

Intuitively, the result presented here

shows that when there are non-traded consumption goods, this equivalence

breaks down.
13.

See Dasgupta (1972) for a useful discussion of this.

14.

This point also has implications for the "domestic resource cost" literature
which also values non-traded commodities by breaking them down into their
inputs by input-output methods, assuming adjustment to occur solely on the
supply side.

15.

Nevertheless, this is virtually the onZy instance in which the Rudra
Weckstein and Dasgupta-Marglin-Sen recommendations on shadow pricing
coincide.

16.

The choice of a linear homogeneous utility function has the added advantage
that it also serves as a true quantity index in consumption space.

See

Lloyd (1975 and 1978).
17.

In the last row of Table 1 the utility outcomes of the various shadow
pricing strategies are expressed as indices, denoted W, with free trade

at 100.

37.

18.

The latter is the clear intention of several authors, including those of

the two JOOst influential studies, Little ~d Mirrlees (1969 and 1974)
and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972).-

These authors envisage widespread

application of benefit cost analysis in a large public production sector
and sometimes, through the control of government approvals, in pricate

sector projects as well •
19.

. . 11 y, s o
A new value of s is then calculated from (12)
Initia
n
n
0
d o
o
.
using pn an r as data. To distinguish it from s n we denote this value
1
in (21) by Sn

r0

= -3.4289, pn* = 1.7143

* = -4.7015.

20.

0
In this case pn

21.

In Warr (1978) it is shown that a "damped" adjustment Of shadow prices

= 1.3389,

and r

can always be devised which will convert non-convergent iterative processes
into convergent ones.

It is clear that damped adjustment can also reduce

the adjustment costs occurring in convergent iterative processes.

*

22.

0
In Numerical Example I, K = 0.6139, and K = 0.5877.

23.

See, for example, Bacha and Taylor (1971) and the references cited

there.
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